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Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium model with technological
uncertainty, financial markets and imperfect information. The future
consists of uncertain environments that are more or less clearly dis-
tinguishable (measurable). This limits the possibilities of specializa-
tion and diversification. Households have no direct information about
the productivity of risky technologies. They rely on the information
conveyed by the set of financial products provided by the financial
sector, the pay-off promises of the products and their prices. Unre-
liable information-processing by financial markets leads to deception
of households. As a result, extending the space spanned by finan-
cial products is not unambiguously good. This suggests a policy rule
which ties financial innovations to the experience base of the economy.
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1 Introduction
Most economists would share the view that financial development is an im-
portant source of prosperity. At the same time, many people think that the
financial sector is responsible for severe crises and misallocations of resources.
The strong growth of the financial sector over the last decades (outlined, for
instance, in Greenwood and Scharfstein [2013] or Philippon [2013]) has moved
the tension between the rival views about financial markets into the core of
public debate. This paper contributes to the understanding of the tension
by considering the nature of financial markets in a general equilibrium model
with technological uncertainty and imperfect information.
The central question is: What are the inputs from the financial sector re-
quired by households and firms and how do they affect the economy? For
answering the question I focus on the information-processing role of the finan-
cial system and ignore other essential functions of financial intermediation
like liquidity provision, asset transformation, risk taking or monitoring, as
usually considered in the literature on financial intermediation and banking
(Cf. Freixas and Rochet [1998;2008]). The information-processing role of
markets relies on the price system as a communication mechanism, as Hayek
[1945] pointed out in his pioneering work. According to Fama [1970], “the
ideal is a market in which ... security prices at any time “fully reflect” all
available information” (p. 383). This paper is silent on whether or not finan-
cial markets are ideal in this sense.1 Prices may convey more or less reliable
1Without doubt the growth of the financial sector has been accompanied by an enor-
mous increase in the number of financial products and prices. Nonetheless, there is no
consensus that the information-processing quality of financial markets has improved. Bai,
Philippon and Savov [2013], for instance, find no evidence for increased information con-
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information – be it that they are not ideal or because they deal with circum-
stances about which little reliable information is available to begin with.2 In
any case, the prices have real consequences. This paper contributes to the
understanding of that consequences. In other words, the paper focuses on the
user side in Hayek’s [1945] communication channel in which “the knowledge
of the circumstances of which we must make use” (p. 519) is produced by
the price formation process that communicates “the information which is in
fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process” (p. 526). Who
are “the people involved in the [price formation, JF] process” and who are
the ones that “must make use” of the information conveyed by the prices?
In this paper, which deals with the information-processing role of financial
product prices, the active part is played by the agents in the financial sector
and the user part is played by the households and firms.3
In sum, the perspective on financial markets taken in this paper is an out-
sider’s one who sees the nature of economic reality from the following bird’s
eye view. Economic objects are “things” with a price tag showing their val-
uation by the market. Financial markets attach to things today their value
for the future. The future however results from saving and investment to-
day, when the future is a set of ideas rather than realised things. What
is then reality and what is the role of financial markets in shaping real-
tent over the past fifty years
2In Hirshleifer’s [1971] words, if things are “hidden from view” and have still to wait
for “discovery”.
3In this respect, the spirit of the paper is related to the review of Bond, Edmans and
Goldstein [1912] (see also Bay, Philippon and Savov [2013]). Their focus, however, is
on the interaction between financial markets and firm decisions, whereas my work takes
a macroeconomic perspective and concentrates mainly on the consequences of financial
markets for the households’ savings decisions and future consumption possibilities.
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ity? According to this paper, the basic function of the financial system is
to provide means to express and exchange promises – financial products –
and to convey information about future possibilities by pricing the products.
Households and firms need these means for transforming ideas about future
possibilities into realised possibilities. Volume and reliability of information
conveyed by the financial products and their prices determine the success of
the transformation. In particular, if the provision of financial products is
based on unreliable information, consumption plans may be deceived. As a
consequence, financial innovations are not necessarily a good thing.
In the further two sections of the introduction, first the modeling principles
and primitives of the analysis are described, then the specific contributions
of the analysis and their relation to the literature are outlined.
1.1 Modeling principles and primitives
The following traits of life in a modern economy are taken as facts. Fact 1 :
The future is partly “men-made” and partly depends from exogenous forces
(“nature”). Fact 2 : The future is uncertain and there is limited knowledge
about the possible realizations of future events. Fact 3 : There are two sources
of information – direct inspection of fundamentals and inference from market
data. Fact 4 : In a complex economic system, individuals act in specialized
roles. In particular, there is specialization in the collection and transmission
of information.
From these facts three basic requirements follow for the transformation of
current resources to future possibilities and its modeling. Requirement 1
4
(“Measurability”): State-contingent resource transformation from present to
the future is only possible for measurable states. Therefore, the modeling
of the state space and its measure is one crucial element in the analysis
of this paper. Requirement 2 (“Real investment”): Present-day household
income can only be saved for future consumption if firms invest the sav-
ings in future production possibilities. The second important element in the
presented model is therefore the set of possible technologies and their state-
contingent performance. Requirement 3 (“Financial intermediation”): The
investment of household savings into future production possibilities of firms
requires instruments for expressing and exchanging promises; whereas the
saved resources have to be given away today, the output from the created
production possibilities accrues tomorrow. The instruments for expressing
and exchanging promises are modeled as financial products characterized by
state-contingent pay-offs. They are designed and priced by financial agents
who collect and aggregate information (about future possibilities and their
risks) by inspection of fundamentals and arbitrage trade.
In sum, the possibilities to transform resources from present to an uncertain
future depend on three objects: the set of measurable states, the set of pos-
sible technologies and the set of financial products. Whereas the allocation
of resources to future possibilities is decided today – on the basis of the in-
formation conveyed by the financial products, the realization of possibilities
takes place in the future. The extent to which future reality matches the
promises of today depends on the information-processing quality of the fi-
nancial system. Thus, if financial agents are careless, they exert a negative
externality on households.4
4In this respect the presented model is related to Magill, Quinzii and Rochet [2013]
who consider a complete market model in which all possible future outcomes are insurable
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1.2 Specific contributions and relation to literature
A first contribution concerns uncertainty. Standard economic reasoning thinks
about the future as an event space, Ω, with a probability measure, π, assign-
ing to each event in Ω the probability of its realization. However, as Keynes
and Knight most prominently pointed out, uncertainty cannot be fully re-
duced to measurable risk. More recent contributions to the foundations of
economic decision making under uncertainty have picked up this issue by
modeling Knightian uncertainty as uncertainty about the probability distri-
bution, where the uncertainty about the latter is captured by characterizing
the set of possible distributions (see for instance Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]
or Bewley [2002]).5 In the baseline model, this paper follows the more rad-
ical view of “true uncertainty”, which Keynes [1937, p. 214] summarized
by the phrase:“We simply do not know.” I account for the principle limits
of knowledge by splitting the future event space into two sets: a subset S
of measurable risks, which in principle can be insured by state-contingent
securities, and a subset S¯ which is not measurable. In addition, I also con-
sider Knightian uncertainty by allowing the measure on S to be more or less
precise.
A second contribution concerns the relationship between specialization, di-
by securities but the risk distribution can be influenced by some agents. Although in the
model presented here neither true probabilities nor true productivities can be influenced,
future production and output will be distorted if the beliefs about probabilities and pro-
ductivities conveyed by the price and pay-off structure of the traded financial products
are inaccurate.
5See also the notion of model misspecification and robustness (Hansen and Sargent
[2007]) or the literature on ambiguity following Ellsberg [1961] (see, for instance, Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. [2013]).
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versification and robustness. The diversification possibilities provided by fi-
nancial markets depend on the state-contingent performance of the technolo-
gies in which savings are invested. Thus, the degree of completeness changes
if more specialized technologies become feasible by innovation. As Diamond
[1967] pointed out, there is an important informational aspect which limits
these possibilities of market completion, namely, “an inability to distinguish
finely among the states of nature in the economy’s trading” (p. 760). The
limit is reflected in the presented model in two ways: First, the unmeasur-
ability of S¯ expresses in a formal way that events within S¯ are not distin-
guishable.6 Second, the measure π on S (the measurable part of Ω) may
be imprecise. On top of the principle constraints on the measurability of
events (or the precision of the measure), knowledge about the performance
of a technology in a specific environment may be imperfect, too. Ultimately,
there exist two possibilities to insure against future uncertainty. Either the
savings are invested into a robust technology which works smoothly under
any exogenous conditions; or the savings are diversified across different inde-
pendent technologies, each of which works well in certain circumstances but
not so well under other conditions. The latter is clearly brought out by the
paper of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) on risk, diversification and growth.7
In their model diversification is limited by minimum size requirements for
innovation. In contrast, in my analysis markets are incomplete because of
limited knowledge about the future. As a consequence, financial innovation
– allowing households and firms to save in more diversified portfolios and to
6Formally, S¯ is thus a single state so that the state space is given by S ∪ {S¯}.
7At the aggregate level, the model presented here essentially coincides with their frame-
work if perfect measuring of risks is assumed, precise knowledge about the technological
uncertainty is available, and transaction costs for financial intermediation are set to zero.
Yet, neither economic growth nor long-run development are considered here.
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invest into more specialized technologies, respectively – is not necessarily a
good thing. On the one side, as long as markets are missing in the mea-
surable part of the future, financial innovations that cover additional risks
increase diversification possibilities. On the other side, if the new financial
products and their prices are based on imprecise information, they generate
new uncertainty. This and the uncertainty in the non-measurable part of
the future cannot be insured by providing more state-contingent financial
instruments. In sum, any innovation based on erroneous measurement of the
future generates uninsured uncertainty in the diversified part of savings and
investments. As a consequence, the allocation of savings is distorted away
from robust technologies to non-performing specialized technologies.
The third contribution concerns the consequences of specialization in the ac-
quisition and dissemination of information. According to the approach of
this paper, a specialized intermediation role has emerged – to have exper-
tise for collecting information about fundamentals, coordinating beliefs by
arbitrage, and communicating the results in the financial instruments and
their prices. In other words, since there are no “invisible hands” or virtual
auctioneers who could provide intertemporal financing possibilities at cor-
rect prices, “embodied” financial agents act in this function. There are two
sources of information: direct inspection of reality and inference from market
data. In contrast to most of the literature on the information-processing role
of markets,8 in the framework presented here the window of direct inspection
8Including the literature on crises and belief volatility which has recently emerged.
There, information is heterogeneous insofar as different agents receive different private
signals. Access to private signals, however, is symmetric in the sense that all agents re-
ceive a signal drawn independently from the same distribution (see Angeletos and Werning
[2006] for an important example – based on the information structure considered in Morris
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is not open equally to all agents. In particular, households cannot directly in-
spect the state-contingent performance of technologies. Moreover, unlimited
arbitrage is only possible for financial agents.9 These assumptions model the
fact that individuals act in specialized roles.10 The agents in the real sector –
households and firms – save in portfolios and invest in specific technologies,
respectively; the set of financial instruments they can use, as well as the pay-
off promises and prices they face, are given by the financial sector: that is,
by the aggregate outcome of the direct inspection and arbitrage activities of
the financial agents. The activities of the financial agents require resources
and Shin [1998]). In Grossman and Stiglitz [1976,1980] only a subset of agents acquires
information; yet the subset is randomly drawn and individuals are symmetric ex ante.
Symmetric dispersion of information was suggested by Hayek‘s [1945] view that knowl-
edge “never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
process”(p. 519). At the same time, however, he acknowledged that “different kinds of
knowledge ”are “at the disposal of particular individuals” or “in the possession ... of
experts” (p. 521).
9There are clearly exemptions. For instance, if a household invests in a house to live
in. In general, however, the typical household is not owner or expert of the projects which
are financed by her or his savings. Moreover, also households and firms may participate
in the financial market for speculative motives. But this is not their core function; if it is,
they switched roles.
10To think in a model of roles or functions was common in Classical Political Economy
(see Schumpeter [1954; 1959, pp.554-561] on actors and agents – or ’functional classes’ –
in the classic modeling.) Traditional macroeconomics also separates the roles of consumer
(or workers) and investors. Moreover, it takes a stand on who plays an active or a passive
role in determining aggregate outcomes, as emphasized most clearly by Kalecki (see Laski
[1987] for a concise introduction into his work). By contrast, in current economic modeling
it has become usual that each individual acts in all roles. This misses the fact that roles
emerge in a system to exploit the advantages of specialization. See also Solow [2008] on
the importance of accounting for different roles.
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as input. The costs are financed by pay-off differentials for borrowers and
lenders.11 Their aggregate value represents the size of the financial sector in
terms of GDP. (This holds regardless of whether the incomes of the financial
sector include rents or correspond to minimal costs.)
By focusing on the most basic traits of an economy with financial markets
the paper disregards many relevant facets of these traits and ignores a lot of
important issues. In particular, the paper does not address any monetary or
financing aspects (like liquidity or leverage) nor dynamical issues (like herd-
ing or financial cycles), which build the core of the current discussion about
financial crises and policies to deal with such crises.12 Moreover, it does not
explain the allocation of information-processing resources and the produc-
tion of information within the financial sector. This function is captured by
11These differentials, working like a tax, are exogenous in the paper. Thus, the presented
analysis is silent about whether the financial sector exerts its intermediation function in a
cost-efficient way. For a more elaborated analysis of the banking sector in a model with
technological uncertainty see Studer [2013]; there, the cost function of banks and compe-
tition between banks are explicitly modeled, and financial innovation as well as the size
of the banking sector are endogenously determined by the interplay of bank competition
and diversification-seeking consumers.
12As Geanakoplos [2010] puts it, an important lesson from the current crisis is “that
the macro economy is strongly influenced by financial variables beyond prices”(p.6) –
leverage in his case. Or in Shin’s [2007] words: “...the common thread [of the literature
on liquidity, JF] is the relationship between funding conditions and the resulting market
prices of assets”(p. 317). In a similar vein, Brunnermeier and Sannikov [2014] put financial
frictions and the risk created by endogenous amplification of such frictions in the center
of their macroeconomic model with a financial sector. See also Borio [2012] on the need
to integrate monetary and financing constraints in macroeconomic models – on top of
financial intermediation in the allocation of resources between savers and investors – and
to consider medium-term financial cycles in addition to business cycles.
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assuming that prices and pay-offs of financial products satisfy a no-arbitrage
condition. That means, financial markets are successful in coordinating fi-
nancial agents and aggregating their information and beliefs, but they do
not necessarily provide efficient collection of information about fundamen-
tals. The focus of this paper is on the consequences of a given information-
processing quality of the financial sector for production and consumption.
It is complementary to the finance and monetary macroeconomics literature
and wants to contribute to the “broad-exploration mode” (Caballero [2010])
of our discipline’s thinking.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, uncertainty structure,
technology and boundaries of knowledge are discussed and formally outlined.
Section 3 deals with the role of financial agents and firms. The behavior of
households, in particular their saving decision, is analyzed in Section 4. In
Section 5, the consequences of unreliable financial prices are considered by
comparing planned and realised consumption levels to each other. Section 6
characterizes the size of the financial sector relative to GDP and discusses
the quality of the financial sector. Section 7 applies the analysis to a model
in which all future events are insurable in principle, but financial innovations
come with a cost: unprecise probability assessment. In this way, macro-
economic effects of Knightian uncertainty are analyzed and the meaning of
unreliable financial innovations is characterized in a rigorous way. Finally,
as an illustration, a rule for the appropriate variety of financial products
(in relation to the experience base of the economy) is derived. Section 8
concludes.
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2 Uncertainty structure, technology and bound-
aries of knowledge
2.1 Uncertainty structure
There are two periods of time: Presence, t = 0, and future, t = 1. The future
is uncertain. Let Ω be the set of possible future events that are potentially
relevant for economic performance. Each ω ∈ Ω describes an exogenous
environment that is possibly realised in t = 1. Because of limited knowl-
edge not all events can be distinguished from each other and measured in a
meaningful way. Formally, space Ω is partitioned into a subspace S and its
complement S¯ ≡ Ω − S. S can be measured by a probability measure πω,∑
ω∈S πω = 1. No such measure exists on S¯. In other words, ω ∈ S are the
“distinguishable” environments – the states – for which specialized technolo-
gies and state-contingent financial products can be designed in principle. No
such specialization or diversification is possible within S¯. The measure of S
and S¯ in Ω is µ(S) = µ, µ(S¯) = 1− µ.13
2.2 Technologies
The output of the economy consists of one final good which can be used for
consumption and investment. The price of this good is set equal to one.
13π and µ are measures on different fields. Formally, there is a probability space (S,A, π),
with A containing all singletons in S, and a probability space (Ω,
{
∅, {S}, {S¯},Ω
}
, µ). Note
also that unmeasurability of S¯ does not imply that agents are unaware of S¯ in the sense
of Modica and Rusticchini [1999].
12
Production uses capital as input. I assume that technologies are linear in
capital. Moreover, to focus on the role of the financial sector in helping to
transform income of today into income tomorrow, it is assumed that capital
fully depreciates after production so that only the capital invested in t = 0
matters as input for production in t = 1. In t = 1, all output is consumed
and life ends.
There are two types of technologies for producing final output: a robust
technology and risky technologies. The robust technology works in any en-
vironment. Formally, each unit of physical capital invested into the robust
technology generates, for any realization ω ∈ Ω, the output a > 0. In con-
trast, risky technologies are highly productive, but sensitive to the realised
environment. More specifically, each technology works only in a particular
environment. In S¯ none of them is productive. Formally, for each s ∈ S,
there exists a risky technology s with stochastic productivity
A˜s(ω) =


Aω if s = ω and ω ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Possible interpretations are, for instance, specialized techniques targeted to
clearly specified conditions. No such specialization is possible for the indis-
tinguishable environments in S¯.
There is a trade-off between specialization advantage and risk. On the one
side, a technology is more productive if it is targeted to a more specific envi-
ronment – provided that the relevant environment is realised. On the other
hand, specific environments are less likely. The trade-off is modeled in the
following way. Specialized technologies are generated from a general stock
of knowledge, A. The productivity of a technology, specialized to a partic-
13
ular environment, is inversely related to the probability of the environment.
The following condition captures this property of the productivity generating
process formally: For all ω ∈ S,
πωAω = A, µA > a. (2)
Conditional on S, the expected productivity level of all environment-specific
technologies is equal to A, the economy’s stock of knowledge for highly pro-
ductive risky projects.14 Moreover, unless S¯ is realised, specialized technolo-
gies are more productive than the robust technology. It is worth noting that
the unconditional expectation of an environment-specific productivity is µA
since ω ∈ S is realised with probability µ. Only share µ of A is exploitable
for environment specific projects.15
2.3 Knowledge structure
All agents see the world in the described framework. In general, however,
they have imperfect knowledge about the true values of the fundamentals so
that their behavior is based on beliefs about the fundamentals. Let S∗, π∗ ≡
14Alternatively, we could read (1) and (2) as follows: There exists risky technologies
s ∈ S which perform with productivity Aω in a good state and do not deliver output in a
bad state. The probability that for a particular technology a good state emerges is inversely
related to its productivity level. One further property of specification (2) is worth noting.
Rewriting (2) as πω = A/Aω and summing over ω ∈ S, we obtain A = [
∑
ω∈S 1/Aω]
−1
and πω = [Aω
∑
ω∈S 1/Aω]
−1. Hence, if Aω is known for all ω ∈ S, then one can infer A
and πω.
15If π is given by the uniform distribution on Ω = [0, 1] and Aω = A is assumed, we
get the specification used in Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997], where specialized technologies
are available for all ω ∈ Ω, but fixed costs limit the range (µ) of realised technologies (in
interaction with market size).
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(π∗ω)ω∈S∗ , µ
∗ and A∗, a∗ denote these true values and let Si, πi ≡ (πiω)ω∈Si,
µi, A
i and ai be the respective beliefs of agent i.
There are three types of agents: Households (N), firms (IF ) and financial
agents (IB). They have different access to information about the fundamen-
tals. In particular, households have no direct access to information about the
performance of specific technologies in particular environments. This infor-
mation is spread across firms and aggregated by the financial agents. After
all, scale effects in information acquisition about investment projects are the
reason why a specialized role of financial intermediation exists according to
the approach of this paper. By direct inspection of firms and arbitrage trad-
ing the financial agents collect and aggregate information. The arbitrage
trading also coordinates beliefs within the financial sector; they are commu-
nicated through the market data. The next section discusses this in more
detail.
In particular, the set of insurable states can be inferred from the set of
financial products supplied. Since a product insuring a state ω has only a
market if households and firms consider ω as measurable, I assume that the
beliefs about S∗ coincide across agents. That is, there exists S so that
Si = S for all i.
Moreover, I assume that all agents have perfect knowledge about the pro-
ductivity of the robust technology. That is,
ai = a∗ for all i.
15
3 Financial markets and capital demand by
firms
Financial agents (“banks”) offer two types of financial products: a bond
which households and firms can use for lending and borrowing at a fixed
interest rate; and, for each ω ∈ S, an Arrow-security. In reality we have of
course more complex financial products. From the abstract point of view
of the presented model, however, the essential property of products is their
capacity to provide state-contingent savings and financing opportunities. As
a consequence, financial innovation – that is, the provision of new financial
products – boils down to extending the set S of states for which a security
is available. By designing state-contingent financial products, the financial
sector informs the market about what is considered as diversificable risk. S
may be smaller or larger than S∗. Since the consequences of S ⊃ S∗ are
straight-forward – non-honored promises for ω ∈ S−S∗ – we assume S ⊂ S∗
in the further analysis. If S = S∗ is reached, markets are completed with
respect to the measurable state space S∗ ∪ {S¯∗}. As long as there is a non-
empty set S¯∗ of unmeasurable events, however, they remain incomplete with
respect to the event space Ω.
Firms use the financial products for financing their capital demand. House-
holds use the products for investing their savings. The conditions for house-
holds and firms differ as follows: A firm borrowing in t = 0 one unit by
issuing a bond has to pay r units in t = 1. In contrast, a household buying
a bond in t = 0 earns
rh = r(1− τ
−)
16
units in t = 1, where 0 ≤ τ− < 1 and rh > 0. The prices of Arrow-securities
are denoted by (qω)ω∈S. The gross pay-offs they promise are (Rω)ω∈S. That
means, if a firm sells one unit of an ω-security, it receives qω units of capital
in t = 0 and has to pay back, in t = 1, Rω units of output, if ω is realised,
and zero otherwise. The corresponding pay-offs for the saving household are
Rhω = Rω(1− τ
+), ω ∈ S
with 0 ≤ τ+ < 1. It seems reasonable to assume that fees for risky assets are
higher than those for bonds, that is: τ+ > τ−.
The aggregate fee volume raised by τ− and τ+ constitutes the financial agents
income. They are risk-neutral and have unlimited access to funds for exploit-
ing arbitrage opportunities at zero cost. As a consequence, arbitrage trade
equalizes expected returns across ω-securities and coordinates beliefs across
financial agents. In equilibrium the following property holds.
Property 1. (No-arbitrage condition). There exists πb and R > 0 so that
πi = πb, for all i ∈ IB, and
πbωRω
qω
= R, for all ω ∈ S. (3)
Condition (3) implies the following fact.
Fact 1. πb and R can be inferred from (qω/Rω)ω∈S. For all ω ∈ S,
πbω =
qω/Rω
Q
and R =
1
Q
, where Q ≡
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rω
. (4)
Proof. 1 =
∑
ω∈S
πbω =
∑
ω∈S
R qω/Rω and π
b
ω =
qω
Rω
R = qω/Rω
Q
.
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This shows how financial market data fully reveal the risk assessment of
the market. Yet, there is no guarantee that the market measures the risky
fundamentals in a perfect way.16 The assessment of π∗ by the financial market
may be distorted for two reasons: Accurate assessment may be unfeasible; or
too little effort is spent on the inspection of fundamentals.17 The following
assumption is imposed on possible distortions.
Assumption 1. For all ω ∈ S,
πbω = π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω) (5)
(Note that
∑
ω∈S
πbω = 1 implies
∑
ω∈S
π∗ωǫω = 1− π
∗
S, π
∗
S ≡
∑
ω∈S
π∗ω.)
Firms have to finance their capital input by issuing bonds or securities.
(There is no internal financing.) Risky technologies are financed by Arrow
16As stated already, specification (2) implies that (πω)ω∈S and A can be inferred if
(Aω)ω∈S is known. Likewise (Aω)ω∈S can be inferred from (πω)ω∈S and A. Incorrect
beliefs about (π∗ω)ω∈S , (A
∗
ω)ω∈S and A
∗ arise if the following two conditions hold: i) A∗ω
is improperly assessed for some ω; ii) π∗ω is improperly assessed, for some ω, or the A
∗-
assessment is wrong.
17This paper does not provide any microfoundation of how financial agents collect and
aggregate information. Let T be the total amount of resources raised by the fees τ−, τ+.
The financial sector can spend this resources on two activities: direct inspection of fun-
damentals (TI) and arbitrage trade (TA). Both activities are required for collecting and
aggregating information; assume there is an optimal mix ξ∗ = TA/TD. Actually, however,
the resources may be allocated in an inefficient way. Or total resources T are too scarce to
allow accurate assessment of fundamentals even under optimal allocation ξ∗. For instance,
if the measure of differentiated environments is large, the cost of acquiring and aggregating
information may be high and risk assessment more erroneous (see Section 7 for further
explanation of this argument.) One could also relate the error process ǫω to the principal
limits of informational efficiency shown by Grossman and Stiglitz [1980].
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securities; robust technologies are financed by bonds. There is no asymme-
try between firms and financial agents with respect to the information which
type is financed with a given instrument.
Investing one unit of capital in technology A˜s requires to sell 1/qω units of
security for ω = s in t = 0, for which Rω/qω units have to be paid back if
ω ∈ S is realised in t = 1. According to (1) and (2), a firm f that wants
to run technology A˜s believes that in state ω the output generated by one
unit of capital (invested into the technology) is Afω = A
f/πfω, where f refers
to f ’s belief about the respective fundamentals. As a consequence, capital
demand Kω for a technology specialized to ω is given by:
Kω =


∞ if Af/πfω > Rω/qω,
fully elastic at Af/πfω = Rω/qω,
0 otherwise
This implies the following fact.
Fact 2. Specialized technologies can only be financed with Arrow-securities.
Moreover, A
f
πfω
= Rω
qω
if and only if:
πfω = π
b
ω for all ω ∈ S, and A
f = R (= 1/Q). (6)
(In the following superscripts f and b are omitted.)
Proof. According to (3), Rω
qω
= R
πbω
. Thus, A
f
πfω
= Rω
qω
is equivalent to πbω =
πfωR/A
f . Summing over ω gives us 1 = R/Af and thus πbω = π
f
ω. Moreover,
according to (4), R = 1/Q.
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In an analogous way, we have18: Capital demand for robust technologies is
fully elastic at
r = a∗. (7)
Since capital demand by firms is fully elastic, the capital inputs in future
production possibilities are determined by the volume and the structure of
aggregate savings.
4 Households and savings
In t = 0 the economy is endowed with a resource Y0 distributed over a mass
N of households. Let yi0 be the endowment of household i. Part of the
endowment, ci0, is consumed, the other part, denoted by bi, is saved. The
saving is done partly by purchasing a portfolio of Arrow securities, (ziω)ω∈S,
and partly by buying bonds, li. The income from saving, resulting in t = 1, is
fully spent on consumption ciω. For any ω ∈ S, the effective sum available for
spending may be disturbed by an idiosyncratic process eiω with
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωe
i
ω =
0. In sum, conditional on the financial instruments offered by the financial
sector, household i faces the following budget constraints:
ci0 = y
i
0 − bi,
bi =
∑
ω∈S
qωz
i
ω + li,
ciω =


Rhωz
i
ω + rhli + e
i
ω, if ω ∈ S,
rhli otherwise.
(8)
18Financing a robust technology with ω-securities would mean that the firm has to pay
back Rωqω =
A
piω
> A if ω ∈ S is realised; the actual return though is a∗ < A.
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Households have logarithmic intertemporal preferences with a discount δ ∈
[0, 1] on the future. The perception of and the reasoning about the future
follows the structure described in Section 2. Let πi = (πiω)ω∈S and 0 < µi < 1
be the beliefs of household i about π∗ and µ∗, respectively.19 For a mixed
portfolio with both saving in bonds and saving in risky assets we have to
impose the condition
rh
Rh
< µi < 1, (9)
where Rh ≡
1−τ+
Q
.
The household’s saving and portfolio choice is given by the program
Max
bi, (ziω)ω∈S, li
EU = log(ci0) + δ
[
µi
∑
ω∈S
πiω log(c
i
ω) + (1− µi) log(rhli)
]
subject to (8). As shown in the Appendix, this program leads to the following
saving and consumption plans.
Proposition 1. For a household with beliefs (πiω)ω∈S, µi,
a) the optimal saving is given by:
bi =
δyi0 − E˜e
i
1 + δ
li = (1− µi)
bi + E˜e
i
1− rh/Rh∑
ω∈S
qωz
i
ω = bi − li
(10)
with Rh ≡
1−τ+
Q
= (1− τ+)R and E˜ei ≡ 1
1−τ+
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rω
eiω.
19If i has correct beliefs, µi = µ
∗
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω ≤ µ
∗. If i assesses the measure µ∗ correctly
and otherwise follows the beliefs conveyed by the financial market, then µi = µ
∗, as∑
ω∈S πω = 1. In general, µi can adopt any value between zero and one.
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b) The planned individual consumption levels are:
ciω =


µi
πiω
πω
Rh
(
bi + E˜e
i
)
, if ω ∈ S
rhli otherwise.
(11)
Thus, financial markets promise to fully smooth consumption across ω ∈ S.
Moreover, a consumer fully bears the risk resulting from deviations of his or
her beliefs πiω from πω – the beliefs conveyed by the financial product charac-
teristics and their prices.20 As equation (11) shows us, ciω is fully insured on
S if and only if πiω = πω. According to (4), the consumer can infer πω from
(qω)ω∈S and (Rω)ω∈S and eliminate this risk by adjusting π
i
ω to πω. If con-
sumer i is insecure about πiω he or she will do so. If however, i is convinced
that πiω is closer to the true value than πω, then the returns R
h
ω/qω = Rh/πω
are considered as distorted and he or she plans to consume less than financial
markets suggest, if πiω < πω, and more, if π
i
ω > πω. Clearly, the households
also pay the costs of unreliable risk and productivity assessment by the fi-
nancial market. If R 6= A∗ or πω 6= π
∗
ω, actual pay-off, A
∗
ω, will deviate from
promised pay-off Rω and consumer plans will be deceived. Section 5 will
analyze the deviations between planned and realised consumption in detail.
Finally, it is worth noticing that eiω enters the saving decisions by its financial
market valuations, E˜ei. Thus, in general, both the structure of the portfolio
(li, bi− li) and the level of savings, bi, depend on the financial sector’s beliefs
about the future. To see how, we calculate E˜ei = 1
Rh
∑
ω∈S πωe
i
ω, which for
S = S∗ is equivalent to E˜ei =
Cov∗(ǫ,ei)
Rh
, where Cov∗(ǫ,ei) ≡
∑
ω∈S∗ π
∗
ωǫωe
i
ω
is the covariance of belief distortion and exogenous income shocks.21 If mar-
20This is consistent with no-arbitrage condition (3), because by assumption households
do not participate in pure arbitrage trade.
21According to (4), E˜ei = 1Rh
∑
ω∈S πωe
i
ω, where Rh =
1−τ+
Q has been used. Now,
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kets believe that positive income shocks dominate, then the present value
of exogenous future income is positive. As a consequence, the saving level
declines and the portfolio structure shifts in favor of bonds, ceteris paribus.
This effect is moderated, if due to euphoric beliefs about the productivity
of risky technologies the promised pay-offs of risky assets are high; and en-
hanced if the beliefs are pessimistic. For a household with Cov∗(ǫ,ei) < 0,
we have the opposite effects on the saving behavior. In the further analysis
the channel E˜ei will be shut down due to the aggregation assumption I im-
pose for simplicity reasons. Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind that,
in general, financial market valuations also affect accumulation through the
value assigned to exogenous future opportunities that are not generated by
accumulation.
Before we turn to aggregation, I want to summarize the conditions for an
equilibrium.
Definition 1. (Equilibrium). An economy with a financial sector – charac-
terized by S, (Rω)ω∈S, (qω)ω∈S, r and τ
−, τ+ – and a real sector – with firm
beliefs (Afω)ω∈S and household beliefs π
i and µi – is in equilibrium in t = 0,
if the following conditions hold: a) r = a∗. b) (Rω)ω∈S, (qω)ω∈S satisfy no-
arbitrage conditions (3) for beliefs (πω)ω∈S and R which are consistent with
(6). c) For all households i, savings decisions bi, li, (zω)ω∈S and consumption
plans (ciω)ω∈S satisfy optimality conditions (10) and (11).
Future production possibilities are determined by the aggregate investment
levels. Since under equilibrium conditions capital demand by firms is fully
elastic, equalization of aggregate saving and investment is automatically
∑
ω∈S πωe
i
ω =
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωe
i
ω +
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωǫωe
i
ω, where
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωe
i
ω = 0 by assumption.
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guaranteed. In t = 1, no actions can be taken and households are exposed
to the consequences of the actions set in t = 0 and the environment realised
in t = 1.
Provided that bi > 0 and li > 0 for all i, the equations in (10) and (11) can
be easily aggregated if the following assumption is made.
Assumption 2. (a) There exists a household h so that for almost all i ∈ N :
µi = µh and π
i
ω = π
h
ω. (b) For all ω ∈ S,
∫
N
eiωdi = 0.
Under this assumption we obtain from (10) for total savings, B, savings in
bonds, L, and savings in state-contingent securities:22
B =
δ
1 + δ
Y0,
L =
1− µh
1− ρh
B,
B − L =
µh − ρh
1− ρh
B,
(12)
where ρh ≡
rh
Rh
, which can also be expressed in the form
ρh = rQ/τ, τ ≡
1− τ+
1− τ−
. (13)
For owning one unit of income in every state ω ∈ S, one would need to buy
zω =
1
Rhω
units of each security. This requires 1
1−τ+
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rω
= Q
1−τ+
units of
cash in t = 0. Putting this into the bond would give rhQ
1−τ+
= rQ/τ in each
ω ∈ Ω. Thus, rQ/τ describes the terms of trade between having one unit of
income if the future lies in S or one unit of income for sure. Representation
ρh = rQ/τ gives us the look at the world when we see it through the lens of
the valuation by the financial markets. We can represent ρh also in terms of
22Note that
∫
N
E˜eidi = E˜
∫
N
eiωdi = 0 as
∫
N
eiωdi = 0 by assumption.
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the productivity beliefs of banks and firms coordinated and communicated
by the financial market. By using (6) and (7), we obtain
ρh =
a∗
τA
. (14)
This represents the look at the economy from the real perspective.
The third equation in (12) shows aggregate savings in form of securities. The
allocation of B − L on the various securities determines the capital input to
firms available for a particular technology. Let Iω denote the amount invested
into security ω ∈ S. It is given by Iω =
∫
N
qωz
i
ωdi. Solving the household’s
budget constraint (8) for ziω and aggregating, we obtain
Zω ≡
∫
N
ziωdi =
1
Rhω
(Cω − rhL), (15)
where, according to Assumption 2 and the first equation in (11),
Cω ≡
∫
N
ciωdi =
µhπ
h
ω
πω
RhB. (16)
Substituting (16) for Cω and (12) for L into (15) and multiplying by qω, we
have
Iω = πω
πhω
πω
µh(1− ρh)− ρh(1− µh)
1− ρh
B (17)
where qω
Rhω
= πω
Rh
has been used from (3).
Iω is increasing in π
h
ω/πω. Although households play a passive role in the
financial market, their beliefs can in principle have an influence on the struc-
ture of realised projects. A higher share of savings goes to technologies that
perform well in states which households belief to be more likely than banks
and firms do. Nonetheless, the transformation of resources to the future cru-
cially depends on the risk and productivity assessment of financial markets,
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represented by π and ρh. Even if households hold correct beliefs about fun-
damentals, they have to trade at the conditions provided by the market. If
they are distorted, households can at best moderate the external effect of
distortions by careful assessment of fundamentals on their own, for instance
by some market independent institution. For eliminating the distortions,
this institution would have to intervene in the financial market by doing ar-
bitrage trade on the households’ behalf – on top of coordinating their beliefs
on correct fundamental values. More realistically, if there is no such collec-
tive coordination by market independent institutions, the average household
will follow the beliefs that can be inferred from the market according to (4).
Assumption 3. For all ω ∈ S, πhω = πω
(
= qω/Rω
Q
)
.
With this assumption, equation (17) reduces to
Iω = πω(B − L) for ω ∈ S. (18)
In an economy with no unmeasurable uncertainty and correct assessment of
risks and productivities, aggregate accumulation in the presented framework
coincides with the model of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) if transactions
costs for financial intermediation are absent.23 In contrast to their frame-
work, in the model presented here – even under correctly priced securities
– financial innovations are only productive as long as S is a strict subset of
S∗. Moreover, if based on unreliable information, financial innovations are
distortive within S, too.
23Specify S∗ = Ω = [0, 1] with true risk measured by the uniform distribution. Moreover,
set S = [0, µ], πω = 1/µ, µh = µ, τ = 1 and define R¯ ≡ µA. Then, ρh =
r
R¯
µ so that (12)
and (18) reduce to L = R¯(1−µ)
R¯−rµ
, B − L = µ(R¯−r)
R¯−rµ
, Iω =
R¯−r
R¯−rµ
.
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5 Financial beliefs meet reality: Planned vs.
realised consumption
In t = 0, household saving, B, is invested in risky technologies, Iω, ω ∈ S,
and robust technologies, L, respectively. This allocation is based on the
valuation of future events, as reflected in the prices and pay-off promises
of assets offered in the financial market and on the households’ belief µh.
Thus, there are essentially two potential sources of misguided saving and
investment decisions: wrong household beliefs with regard to the measure of
insurable future events (µh 6= µ
∗); and a distorted return structure Rω/qω,
conveying wrong productivity and risk expectations (πω 6= π
∗
ω, R 6= A
∗).
As a consequence, households’ consumption plans may not be sustained by
reality. This section compares, at the aggregate level, for the different sources
of distortions the optimal plans with the actually realised outcome.
5.1 Planned consumption levels
According to (11), (12) and (16), under Assumption 1 and 2, the consumption
levels planned for t = 1 aggregate to:
Cpω =


µhRhB ≡ C
p
+, if ω ∈ S,
rhL =
1−µh
1−ρh
rhB ≡ C
p
−
, if ω ∈ S¯.
(19)
This gives us for the ratio of consumption planned for the future with un-
measurable uncertainty, S¯, relative to the future with measurable risk, S:
Cp
−
Cp+
=
1− µh
µh
ρh
1− ρh
. (20)
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C+
C−
45 ◦
rhB
1−ρh
µh
1−µh
Cp
1−µh
µh
ρh
1−ρh
EU = const.
ρh
1−ρh
RhB
Figure 1: Consumption plan under µh, ρh
For a graphical illustration it is useful to express also the households’ in-
tertemporal budget constraint in terms of C+, C−. Using (15), we can rewrite
this constraint in the form:24
ρhC
p
+ + (1− ρh)C
p
−
= rhB. (21)
Figure 1 shows expansion path (20) and budget constraint (21) in the (C+, C−)-
space. Intersection point Cp represents the consumption plan resulting under
µh and ρh. In addition, we define an aggregate utility index EU(C+, C−) ≡
µh logC
p
+ + (1− µh) logC
p
−
and calculate
dCp
−
dCp+
∣∣∣
EU=const.
= −
µh
1− µh
Cp
−
Cp+
. (22)
24Note first: B =
∑
ω∈S qωZω + L =
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rh
ω
RhωZω + L. Applying (15) we get from
this: B =
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rh
ω
(Cpω−C
p
−)+L =
Q
1−τ+ (C
p
+−C
p
−)+C
p
−/rh, which finally gives us (21).
Note that ρh = rh/Rh = rQ/τ .
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For C− = C+, the absolute value of the slope of the iso-EU curve is
µh
1−µh
.
To the right of the 45◦-line, the value diminishes – becoming tangential to
the budget constraint at Cp. Therefore, aggregated consumption plans can
be represented as optimum of a representative household which maximizes
EU(C+, C−) subject to (21).
An immediate implication of (22) is that the representative indifference curve
through a given point Cp rotates clockwise if µh increases. Ceteris paribus,
this shifts the optimal plan south-east; the expansion path rotates clockwise,
too.
5.2 Realised consumption levels
In t = 1, households receive the output of the production capacities created
by their savings in t = 0. Yet, part of their saving is absorbed by the costs
of the financial sector. Total costs for the saving in bonds are given by
(r − rh)L = rτ
−L, the value of which is at t = 0:
T− = τ−L.
Total costs for the saving in security ω ∈ S amount to (Rω − R
h
ω)Zω =
τ+RωZω in t = 1. Discounting this by the return rate for this security, which
is Rω/qω, we get for the cost in t = 0 the equivalent τ
+qωZω. Summing over
ω ∈ S, we have:
T+ = τ+(B − L).
Thus, aggregate capital inputs to firms are: Ln = (1 − τ−)L and Kω =
(1− τ+)Iω, ω ∈ S. According to (1) and (2), they allow to produce in t = 1
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the following state-contingent output levels:25
Xω =


A¯∗
π∗ω
Iω + a¯
∗L, if ω ∈ S,
a¯∗L, if ω ∈ S¯,
where A¯∗ = A∗(1−τ+) and a¯∗ = a∗(1−τ−). Note that true productivity lev-
els, A∗ω = A
∗/π∗ω, rather than beliefs are relevant for actual production. Using
Crω = Xω and substituting (18) for Iω we obtain the realised consumption
levels:
Crω =


πω
π∗ω
A¯∗(B − L) + a¯∗L, if ω ∈ S,
a¯∗L ≡ Cr
−
, if ω ∈ S¯.
(23)
Comparison with (19) shows us immediately that Cr
−
= Cp
−
≡ C−. For
ω ∈ S, however, the situation is different. By using πω = π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω), C
r
ω can
be decomposed in the following way:26
Crω = C
r
+ + ǫωA¯
∗(B − L),
Cr+ ≡ C
p
+ +∆,
(24)
where Cp+ is the planned consumption level given by (19) and ∆ is defined
by
∆ ≡ (1− τ+)(A∗ −R)(B − L). (25)
We see that deviations of realised consumption from planned consumption
can come through two channels: ∆ and ǫ.
25If S∗ ⊂ S, then Xω = 0 for ω ∈ S − S∗ and all saving in securities ω ∈ S − S∗ is lost.
By assuming S ⊂ S∗ this drastic case was excluded.
26Note first that Cr+ = C
r
ω − ǫωA¯
∗(B − L) = C− + A¯∗(B − L), ac-
cording to (23). Substituting (12) for L and B − L, we get from this
Cr+ − C
p
+ = rhB
1−µh+(A¯
∗/rh)(µh−ρh)−(µh/ρh)(1−ρh)
1−ρh
, which reduces to ∆ =
rhB
1−µh/ρh+(A
∗/R)(µh/ρh−1)
1−ρh
=
(
A∗
R − 1
)
µh−ρh
1−ρh
rhB
ρh
and gives us (25).
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∆ reflects the deception (surprise) if promised pay-offs are not matched by
the real outcome on average. We have:
∆ < 0 (=, > 0) if R > A∗ (=, < A∗, resp.)
and, if ∆ 6= 0,
∂|∆|
∂µh
> 0.
(26)
Deception (A∗ < R) or surprise (A∗ > R) are magnified by optimistic views
of the households about the “relative size” of the measurable part of future
events (µh), as they induce households to save more in risky assets. Pes-
simistic views on µh moderate average deception and surprise.
The second source of deception or surprise is erroneous risk assessment
(
πω =
qω/Rω
Q
)
conveyed by the return structure of risky assets. It makes realised
consumption volatile within S, even though the events in S are meant to be
fully insured by the available securities. In the worst case, Crω approaches
C−. Then the “deception” C
p
ω − C
r
ω =
µh
ρh
rhB − C− is equal to Rh(B − L).
All saving in risky assets is lost. Section 6 and Section 7 will deepen the
discussion of effects resulting from unreliable risk assessment.
Finally, it is worth noting that not all mistakes are revealed by reality ex post.
In contrast to distorted financial prices and pay-offs, wrong household beliefs
alone do not lead to deception or surprises. They remain undetected in our
two-period framework. According to (25), ∆ = 0 if R = A∗ regardless of the
value of µh. Nevertheless, wrong household beliefs affect the intertemporal
allocation of resources. For an example, consider the case of overconfidence
(µh > µ
∗). Compared to the first-best solution C∗, households are willing
to accept too high a sacrifice of consumption possibilities in unmeasurable
future environments (S¯) in order to obtain high consumption levels in the
measurable part (S). Yet, if the productivity and risk valuation by financial
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markets is correct, no unhonored financial promises will reveal that house-
holds overestimate the extent of the risky future and underestimate the extent
of true uncertainty.
6 Size and quality of the financial sector
The financial services are provided in t = 0, when saving and investment
decisions are made. For determining the share of the financial sector in Y0,
we have to calculate the present value of total costs charged to the real sector.
They represent the income earned in the financial sector. The quality of the
financial sector depends on two components: the degree of diversification that
is made feasible by the provided financial products; and on how reliable their
characteristics and prices convey information about risks and productivities.
6.1 The size of the financial sector
Since fee parameter τ− and τ+ are exogenous in the presented model, total
costs depend on the volume and structure of saving.27 As discussed in the
previous section, we have in the aggregate T− = τ−L and T+ = τ+(B − L),
respectively. Total costs are thus T = τ+B − (τ+ − τ−)L. Substituting (12)
for L and B, we obtain for the relative size of the financial sector in GDP,
27As should be obvious from the abstract character of the presented model, I have
no intention to suggest concrete empirical patterns by the following comparative-static
analysis. See Phillipon [2013] for a careful attempt to measure the long-run development
of the US finance industry’s share in GDP and its determinants empirically. This share
has reached a new high in the last twenty five years.
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T/Y0:
δ
1 + δ
[
τ+ − (τ+ − τ−)
1− µh
1− ρh
]
≡ χ. (27)
Obviously, the banking sector grows with the saving rate, δ
1+δ
, and the
charged fees τ−, τ+. The more interesting question is, how distortions af-
fect the size of the financial sector relative to the real sector. They only
matter if there is a differential in the costs of different forms of saving. Un-
der the reasonable assumption that the costs of services for risky investments
are higher than the cost of services for bonds, we have:
∂χ
∂µh
> 0,
∂χ
∂ρh
< 0.
For any given ρh, euphoric household beliefs – about the extent of measurable
future events – blow up the financial sector, pessimistic beliefs let it shrink.
Euphoric (pessimistic) assessment of risky projects, implying a decline (rise,
resp.) of ρh, has similar effects.
Finally, it is worth noticing that a selective rise in τ+ relative to τ− (for
instance, if more complex financial products are offered) affects the size of
the financial sector in two ways. On the one side, there is a direct positive
effect. On the other side, there is a negative indirect effect through ρh.
Differentiation establishes that for small differences τ+−τ−, the direct effect
dominates, whereas the indirect negative effect dominates if τ+−τ− becomes
large.28
281 > d
[
(τ+−τ−)(1−µh)
1−ρh
]
/dτ+ is equivalent to 1−ρh1−µh > 1+
ρh
1−ρh
τ+−τ−
1−τ+ , where
∂ρh
∂τ+ =
ρh
1−τ+
has been used. Since µh > ρh, the left side of this inequality is larger than one. This proves
∂χ/∂τ+ > 0 if τ+ − τ− is small.
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6.2 The quality of the financial sector
The economic functions of the financial market are to support the transfor-
mation of current resources into future output and to insure against risks.
A possible indicator for the quality of the transformation function is the
correct expectation of future consumption, given the aggregate volume of
saved resources (B) and their structure (L,B − L). In an analogous way,
we can take the correct variance of future consumption as indicator for the
insurance function. For the correct expectation and variance of future out-
put we have to weigh Crω, ω ∈ Ω, with the true measures π
∗
ω for ω ∈ S
∗
and µ∗ for S∗. Let E∗[Cr] = µ∗
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωC
r
ω + [µ
∗(1− π∗S) + (1− µ
∗)]C− de-
note the correct expectation of realised consumption and let VAR∗[Cr] =
µ∗
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω(C
r
ω − E
∗[Cr])2 + [µ∗(1 − π∗S) + (1 − µ
∗)](C− − E
∗[Cr])2 be the
correct variance, where π∗S ≡
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω. E
∗[Cr] and VAR∗[Cr] are hypothet-
ical values, which in general deviate from the values that households have in
mind when making their saving plans.29 Using (23), we obtain:30
E∗[Cr] = µ∗A¯∗(B − L) + a¯∗L. (28)
29The values are hypothetical because households have no possibility to observe the
true values A∗ and A∗ω = A
∗/π∗ω. Nonetheless, they can ask themselves: What outcomes
– in terms of average and deviation from average – are to be expected if financial market
conditions are based on wrong prerequisites? Such thought experiments may seem useless;
a household cannot change the terms at which financial products are traded. Reflection
about the consequences of model uncertainty serve a different purpose. They are useful
for understanding the causes and consequences of imperfect information-processing in
financial markets. Potentially, the understanding then leads to insights on how to improve
the robustness of the financial system. In this spirit a policy rule is suggested in Section
7.
30Note
∑
ω∈S πω =
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω) = 1
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The correct variance VAR∗[Cr] can be written in the form31
VAR∗[Cr] = µ∗D[A¯∗(B − L)]2 (29)
with
D ≡
∑
ω∈S∗−S
π∗ω +
∑
ω∈S
π∗ωǫ
2
ω + 1− µ
∗.
Both true expectation and true variance rise with the volume of risky invest-
ment. Thus, distortions of the portfolio structure due to wrong household
beliefs (µh) about the relative size of the measurable part of the future as well
as distortions in the productivity assessment of risky technologies relative to
the robust ones (R/r) have straightforward effects.
A more interesting question is how financial innovations and the quality of
risk assessment affect true expectation and true volatility of future consump-
tion. To isolate these factors, we assume that households form correct beliefs
so that µh = µ
∗
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω. Thus, if financial innovations increase the measure
of states covered by securities, the savings portfolio shifts towards risky as-
sets, which increases E∗[Cr] as well as VAR∗[Cr]. At the same time, however,
volatility is affected through factor D. The first term, 1−π∗S, π
∗
S =
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω,
is reduced if financial innovations expand the space spanned by securities.
Yet, it may come with a cost, as shown by the second term,
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωǫ
2
ω. This
term captures the volatility increasing effect of unreliable risk assessment by
financial markets. The unreliability effect counteracts the diversification ef-
fect. Finally, the third term of D, 1−µ∗, shows the principle limits of diver-
sification due to unmeasurable uncertainty in the sense of indistinguishable
future environments.
31The proof is in the appendix.
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7 Sound financial development under Knigh-
tian uncertainty
Instead of modeling “true” uncertainty as unmeasurable set of future environ-
ments, one can consider future events as uncertain if they are drawn from a
measurable set with unknown measure. As discussed briefly in the introduc-
tion, this view corresponds to the approach pursued by studies on Knightian
uncertainty. The view can be integrated in the presented framework by split-
ting S∗ ⊂ Ω into subsets with varying precision of the risk distribution. For
simplicity, let us set S∗ = Ω and assume that true probabilities can be ac-
curately assessed for ω ∈ S0, but for ω ∈ S¯0 the true measure is unknown.
That means, financial markets can provide reliable insurance for S0, whereas
outside S0 insurance possibilities are based on unreliable information. More
formally, there is a lower bound on the possible errors ǫω of beliefs about
the probability of ω ∈ S¯0. Whether and how far the beliefs conveyed by
the characteristics and prices of financial products (contingent on ω ∈ S¯0)
deviate from these lower bound depends on the quality of financial markets.
In the further analysis I assume that they accurately assess fundamentals
wherever this is possible in principle. In particualr, I assume that average
productivity is assessed correctly so that R = A∗ in the following.
Let (πˆω)ω∈Ω be the true probability measure on Ω and S ⊂ Ω be the set of
states for which state-contingent securities are offered in the market. Then,
µ(S) =
∑
ω∈S πˆω is the true measure of S; π
∗
ω and πω, which refer in the
presented framework to conditional probabilities on S, are given by:
π∗ω =
πˆω
µ(S)
and πω = π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω),
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where
∑
ω∈S πω = 1 implies
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωǫω = 1 −
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω = 0. This excludes
systematic errors.
By assumption, for ω ∈ S0, the deviations of beliefs from true probabilities
can be fully eliminated by careful risk assessment. In S−S0 such deviations
cannot be avoided. For ω ∈ S0, the productivity assessment is assumed to
be accurate. We have A∗ω = A
∗/π∗ω. This implies ρh = ρ
∗
h = a¯
∗/A¯∗. For
ω ∈ S¯0, neither πˆω nor A
∗
ω are known. The financial sector can be prudent
and accept that there is no reliable informational basis for trading securities
contingent on ω ∈ S¯0. In this case, we have S = S0 with πω = π
∗
ω = πˆω/µh
and µh =
∑
ω∈S0
πˆω in the previous analysis. We can contrast this case with
a scenario in which financial agents also provide state-contingent securities
for a subset S1 of S¯0, guessing, for ω ∈ S1, πω = π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω) and thus
Aω = A
∗/πω. In this scenario, S = S0∪S1 and π
∗
ω = πˆω/µh with µh = µ0+µ1,
µj ≡
∑
ω∈Sj
πˆω, j ∈ {0, 1}. Under the assumption that risky assets involve
higher intermediary fees, the size of the banking sector is larger under the
second scenario compared to the first one. Moreover, as the previous analysis
showed, a larger share of savings is allocated to risky projects, yielding on
average a higher future output at the cost of uncertainty. The uncertainty
hits the economy in t = 1 by deviation of realised from planned consumption,
and, if luck is bad, non-honored pay-off promises.
For a rigorous comparison we consider first the case of a prudent financial
sector. I refer to this scenario by labeling saving and output variables with
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superscript zero. In this case, we have by (12) and (18):
L0 =
1− µ0
1− ρ∗h
B,
B − L0 =
µ0 − ρ
∗
h
1− ρ∗h
B,
I0ω = π
∗
ω(B − L
0).
(30)
In contrast, suppose that securities are provided for ω ∈ S1, too. If house-
holds trust in financial markets, their saving decisions lead to the following
investment structure:
L1 =
1− (µ0 + µ1)
1− ρ∗h
B,
B − L1 =
(µ0 + µ1)− ρ
∗
h
1− ρ∗h
B,
I1ω =


π∗ω(B − L
1) if ω ∈ S0,
πω(B − L
1) if ω ∈ S1,
(31)
where superscript one is used to refer to the scenario with financial inno-
vations for ω ∈ S1 based on unreliable information (πω = π
∗
ω(1 + ǫω) and
Aω = A
∗/πω).
Looking now at the realization of events in t = 1, we see that deception of
households becomes more likely. The chance that ω ∈ S1 is realised in t = 1
is given by µ1. Thus with probability µ1 we end up in an environment in
which realised consumption levels deviate from planned consumption levels.
As shown in Section 5, for ω ∈ S¯, consumption plans Cp
−
are in line with
realised consumption Cr
−
. They are given by
C− = a¯
∗L1. (32)
Furthermore, plans and reality coincide if ω ∈ S0 is realised in t = 1. Since
ρh = ρ
∗
h = a¯
∗/A¯∗ and µh = µ0+µ1 in the present context, consumption levels
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in ω ∈ S0, where πω = π
∗
ω, are given by
32
C+ = (µ0 + µ1)A¯
∗B. (33)
For ω ∈ S1, however, the realised consumption level deviates from the
planned level Cp+ by the term
ǫωA¯
∗(B − L1), (34)
as shown by (24). (Note that ∆ = 0 since A = A∗ in the present context).
If ǫω < 0, firms cannot deliver the promised pay-off Rω. If ǫω > 0, there are
unexpected gains.
Figure 2 illustrates the possible disturbances created by unfounded financial
innovations. In the absence of such innovations C0 would result in t = 1. If
securities are traded for ω ∈ S1, too, then household portfolios are adjusted
so that C1 results as planned consumption point in the (C+, C−)-space. Ac-
tually, however, some point in the bracketed interval around C1 is realised.
The size of the bracketed interval depends on the unreliability of risk and
productivity assessment in S1. One could argue that the error is relatively
small as long as S1 is a small extension beyond S0; and increases, if a larger
extension S ′1 with µ
′
1 > µ1 is covered by financial innovations without reli-
able basis of information about true risks and productivities of technologies
specialized in the new environments. This is illustrated by the expansion
paths for different values of µh. (With µh increasing the expansion path ro-
tates downwards in the (C+, C−)-space.). Whatever the distribution of good
luck and bad luck within the bracket around C1 or C2, there is a fundamen-
tal asymmetry. A realization of Crω which falls short of the planned level is
32Using (31) in (23), we have, for ω ∈ S0, Crω = B[A¯
∗(µh − ρ∗h) + a¯
∗(1− µh)]/(1 − ρ∗h),
which can be rewritten as BA¯∗[µh − ρ∗h + ρ
∗
h(1− µh)]/(1− ρ
∗
h) and reduces to (33)
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not just a loss of consumption opportunities. It also means a loss of confi-
dence in the system, because pay-off promises are broken. The two-period
framework presented here is silent about what happens after the period in
which the unreliability of financial products has been revealed. Therefore,
the costs of a loss of confidence are outside the model. In any case, they
have negative external effects beyond the foregone consumption in t = 1.
Therefore, the valuation of the gains of financial innovations beyond S0 in
terms of expected consumption against their unreliability is more than an
individual consumer’s trade-off under risk-aversion. It is a judgment about
the reliability of the economic system.
Looking from this perspective on the results of the presented model, one can
try to find a rule which relates the tolerable rate of financial innovations to
real economic development. The following example illustrates how this could
be done.
Let, for an ordered index set Γ containing γ = 0, {Sγ}γ∈Γ be a series of
monotonously increasing subsets of Ω with πˆ(S ′γ − Sγ) > 0 for γ
′ > γ. Then
µ(γ) ≡
∑
ω∈Sγ
πˆω is a monotonously increasing function of γ. Let π
∗
ω =
πˆω/µ(γ) be the true conditional probability of ω ∈ Sγ. (πˆ denotes the true
risk distribution over Ω.) Assume that with increasing γ the informational
basis for assessing true risks becomes less and less reliable. Formally, πω =
π∗ω(1 + ǫω(γ)), where ǫω(γ) is an error process satisfying
∑
ω∈Sγ
π∗ωǫω(γ) = 0
and the following assumption.
Assumption 4. (“Weakening experience base”). σ2ǫ (γ) ≡
∑
ω∈Sγ
π∗ω[ǫω(γ)]
2
is increasing in γ, starting at σ2ǫ (0) = 0 and approaching σ¯
2
ǫ .
Assumption 4 means there is a terrain S0 in which risks can be assessed
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Figure 2: Insecurity generated by unreliable financial innovations (µ′1 > µ1 > 0)
accurately. The farther we move away from this terrain, the less reliable is
the informational basis for risk assessment. To be specific, one could use the
world GDP as a proxy for the accumulated experience in the past.
Suppose now that the frontier of financial innovations stands at some γ ≥ 0,
that is, state-contingent financial products are traded for all ω ∈ Sγ . Denote
by σ2C(γ) the variance of consumption in Sγ . According to (24), this variance
is proportional to σ2ǫ (γ). We have:
σ2C(γ) =
[
A¯∗
µ(γ)− ρ∗h
1− ρ∗h
B
]2
σ2ǫ (γ). (35)
The planned consumption in Sγ also increases with γ. According to (19),
Cp+ = µ(γ)A¯
∗B. (36)
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As mentioned previously, volatility σ2C is not just a risk generated by nature;
it comes from the expansion of the set of state-contingent financial prod-
ucts and reveals a mismatch between real possibilities and the possibilities
promised by the financial market.33 Since deception of promises undermine
confidence in the financial system (and can provoke severe crises)34, a soci-
ety may agree that σ2C should be kept in some tolerable relationship to the
plans based on the promises. Since this comes at a cost, societies may accept
more or less deception risk. I call this the “crisis tolerance” of a society.35
Formally, the tolerance can be defined by the following criterion: A society
with crisis tolerance β wishes that
σ2C(γ) ≤ βC
p
+. (37)
Applying this criterion, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. (Policy rule). Under Assumption 4, for each β < A¯∗Bσ¯2ǫ ,
there exists a frontier γ¯(β) so that society’s tolerance bound (37) is guaranteed
if and only if γ ≤ γ¯(β) (with strict inequality if γ¯(β) /∈ Γ). The frontier γ¯(β)
has the following properties: γ¯(0) = 0 and dγ¯(β)
dβ
> 0.
Proof. With (35) and (36) inequality (37) becomes
σ2ǫ (γ) ≤ β
µ(γ)(
µ(γ)− ρ∗h
)2 (1− ρ
∗
h)
2
A¯∗B
. (38)
33Note that realization of C−, if ω ∈ S¯γ , generates no deception since realised consump-
tion matches the plan. For S¯γ no diversification possibilities were promised by the market
and households knew that future consumption will be moderate outside Sγ .
34Crises are “situations in which ‘a great number of merchants and traders at once
either have, or apprehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting their engagements’
...” (Schumpeter [1954, 1959], p. 747 – quoting John Stuart Mill).
35I use this label to avoid confusion with the notion “uncertainty aversion” in Gilboa
and Schmeidler [1989] which is related to Bewley’s [2002] “inertia assumption”. For β = 0
only Sγ = S0 would be tolerable.
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The left side of this inequality is an increasing function of γ, starting at
σ2ǫ (0) = 0 and approaching σ¯
2
ǫ (Assumption 4). The right side of the equa-
tion is positive for γ = 0 and declines with γ towards β
A¯∗B
if µ(γ) = 1 is
approached. Thus, a unique interior intersection point γ¯(β) ∈ R+ exists as
long as β < σ¯2ǫA
∗B. If γ¯(β) /∈ Γ, then, for any γ ∈ Γ, condition (37) holds
if γ < γ¯(β) and does not hold if γ > γ¯(β). The properties of γ¯(β) are an
immediate consequence of the fact that the right-hand side of inequality (38)
rises with β, starting at zero for β = 0.
If GDP is taken as proxy for the reliable experience base, Proposition 2 sug-
gests to tie the financial innovation dynamics down to the long-run growth
rate.36 Policies for implementing such ties would complement regulations
of volumes and frequencies of financial trading on a given set of financial
products. In the approach presented here, the latter regulations affect the
allocation of the financial sector’s resources, T , on direct inspection and ar-
bitrage trade. This should reduce potential inefficiencies within the financial
sector and bring the errors contained in the prices and pay-offs of financial
products closer to the bounds imposed by principal limits of knowledge about
the future. A policy rule based on Proposition 2 would limit the unavoidable
errors arising from overconfidence in the possibilities of financial markets to
generate knowledge about the future.
36This would be analogous to monetary policy rules, which ultimately also are founded
on the argument that excess money supply (through the channel of inflation) destroys the
information-processing quality of markets.
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8 Conclusion
What are the real fundamentals in a world in which objects are composed
of (in the broad sense of the word) physical properties and the valuation of
these properties by financial markets? This paper tried to disentangle the
mixture of “men-made” and exogenous fundamentals. The endeavor was
driven by the firm conviction that, if rationality has any meaning, economic
analysis needs to reflect the principle limits of knowledge and perception with
regard to the future. Basic principals of the proposed framework were the
distinction between risk and uncertainty and a careful tracking of what agents
know, what they do not know, what they know from market information and
what they might know more or less by direct inspection of reality. The answer
was different for different types of agents, depending on their roles, namely
on whether they act as firm, as household or as financial agent.
The main message following from the analysis was that things can go wrong,
due to bad luck, or because of sloppy evaluation of reality and careless dealing
with uncertainty. In the first case, the economy experiences a fatal shock,
which hurts but is no surprise in a world of incomplete knowledge. In the
second case, the distortion is men-made and a crisis of confidence can emerge.
The paper did not provide any microfoundation of the inside of the financial
sector; rather it focused on the consequences of the products and prices pro-
duced by the financial market for production in firms and consumption of
households. According to the presented model, in a crisis households expe-
rience non-honored pay-off promises and deceived consumption plans, which
reveal that the information conveyed by the financial market was based on
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unreliable assessment of future productivities and risks. Therefore, financial
innovations expanding the space spanned by securities are not necessary a
good thing. Missing markets may be better than unreliable ones. Essentially,
two sources of financial market failures can be made responsible for house-
hold deception in the presented framework: First, the allocation of financial
sector resources on collecting and aggregating information about risks and
productivities of risky projects may be distorted. Second, financial innova-
tions provide state-contingent securities for uncertain environments without
reliable information about the measure of events or the real performance of
projects in these environments. To account for the second problem, a policy
rule was outlined in the last section, which attempts to bring the reliability
of financial innovations in line with the crisis tolerance of a society.
A series of problems remained open. In particular, the inside of the financial
sector was taken as a black box in this paper, which is silent on finance
issues in a more narrow sense of the word. The bottom line was that these
issues are complementary to the presented analysis. They concern the trading
within the financial sector, which aggregates the information collected by the
financial agents and coordinates their beliefs in the model. As mentioned,
if financial sector resources employed in arbitrage trade are not aligned to
the resources employed for collecting information from direct inspection of
reality, the information communicated by financial product characteristics
and prices to the households is unreliable.
Finally, learning from real market data was excluded in the presented two-
period framework. This reflects in a radical way the fact that learning pos-
sibilities about future environments from markets data are limited. By ex-
tending the model to more than two periods, one could possibly substantiate
45
a hypothesis about the frequency of crises. According to the uncertainty and
knowledge structure defined in this paper, the learning about fundamentals
in risky environments (π∗ and A∗ω in the model) depends on the number of
observed realizations of events generated by a stationary stochastic risk and
productivity process. If there is a structural break, or if financial innovations
outgrow the speed of learning, then there is a danger of a crisis in the sense
of this paper. In the first case, the learning has to start again. In the sec-
ond case, we have to tame an excessive financial business. In contrast, the
learning about the extent of risky environments compared to unmeasurable
uncertainty – S∗ vs. Ω − S∗ in the model – depends on the frequency of
observations of ω ∈ S∗ as opposed to ω ∈ Ω − S∗. The latter means, we
have to experience bad luck with only robust technologies working properly.
That is, we have to experience fatal shocks, in which the economy works at a
low productivity but which are no surprise and not accompanied by deceived
promises.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimal program of household i
The first-oder conditions for max EU s.t. (8) are for bi, z
i
ω and li, respec-
tively:
1
yi0 − bi
= λi, (A.1a)
δµiπ
i
ω
ciω
Rhω = λiqω, ω ∈ S, (A.1b)
δµi
∑
ω∈S
πiω
ciω
rh + δ
rh(1− µi)
rhli
= λi, (A.1c)
where λi is the Langrange multiplier for constraint
∑
ω∈S qωz
i
ω+li ≤ bi. Using
(A.1b) we can rewrite (A.1c) in the form
λirh
Q
1− τ+
+
δ(1− µi)
li
= λi, (A.2)
with Q ≡
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rω
.
With Rh ≡
1−τ+
Q
equation (A.2) can be rewritten in the form
li =
δ
λi
1− µi
1− rh/Rh
(A.3)
and (A.1b) together with budget constraint (8) for ciω, ω ∈ S, gives us:
ziω =
δ
λi
µiπ
i
ω
qω
−
rhli + e
i
ω
Rhω
(A.4a)
qωz
i
ω =
δ
λi
µiπ
i
ω − (rhli + e
i
ω)
qω
Rhω
(A.4b)
∑
ω∈S
qωz
i
ω =
δ
λi
µi −
rh
Rh
li − E˜e
i (A.4c)
with E˜ei ≡ 1
1−τ+
∑
ω∈S
qω
Rω
eiω.
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Substituting (A.4c) into the budget constraint bi =
∑
ω∈S qωz
i
ω + li, we get
bi = li(1−
rh
Rh
) + δ
λi
µi − E˜e
i. Substituting (A.3) for li, we have
δ
λi
= bi + E˜e
i (A.5)
This, (A.1a) and (A.3) give us
bi =
δyi0 − E˜e
i
1 + δ
,
li = (1− µi)
bi + E˜e
i
1− rh/Rh
.
(A.6)
Using then (A.5) in (A.1b) and R
h
ω
qω
= 1−τ
+
πωQ
from (4) and accounting for
Rh ≡
1−τ+
Q
, we obtain
ciω = (bi + E˜e
i)µi
πiω
πω
Rh. (A.7)
Finally, according to the budget constraint for ciω, ω /∈ S,
ciω = rhli. (A.8)
A.2 Derivation of the VAR∗(Cr)
Use (23), (28) and notation X+ ≡ A¯
∗(B − L), π∗S ≡
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ω, to calculate
(Crω−E
∗[Cr])2 = (1+ ǫω−µ
∗)2X2+ for ω ∈ S, and (C
r
ω−E
∗[Cr])2 = (µ∗X+)
2
for ω /∈ S. Thus,
VAR∗[Cr] = µ∗
[∑
ω∈S
π∗ω(1 + ǫω − µ
∗)2X2+ + (1− π
∗
S)(µ
∗X+)
2
]
+ (1− µ∗)(µ∗X+)
2
= µ∗X2+
{∑
ω∈S
π∗ω(1 + ǫω − µ
∗)2 + [µ∗(1− π∗S) + (1− µ
∗)]µ∗
}
= µ∗X2+
[∑
ω∈S
π∗ω(1 + ǫω − µ
∗)2 + (1− µ∗π∗S)µ
∗
]
.
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In a next step, check that
∑
ω∈S
π∗ω(1 + ǫω − µ
∗)2 =
∑
ω∈S
π∗ω
[
1 + 2ǫω(1− µ
∗) + ǫ2ω − 2µ
∗ + µ∗
2]
= π∗S + 2(1− π
∗
S)(1− µ
∗) +
∑
ω∈S
π∗Sǫ
2
ω − π
∗
S(2µ
∗ − µ∗
2
)
= 2(1− π∗S)(1− µ
∗) +
∑
ω∈S
π∗Sǫ
2
ω + π
∗
S(1− µ
∗)2,
where
∑
ω∈S π
∗
ωǫω = 1− π
∗
S has been used.
Thus, the square-bracketed term in the last equation of VAR∗ [Cr] reduces
to D, as the following calculation shows:
2(1− π∗S)(1− µ
∗) +
∑
ω∈S
π∗ωǫ
2
ω + π
∗
S(1− µ
∗)2 + (1− µ∗π∗S)µ
∗
=
∑
ω∈S
π∗ωǫ
2
ω + (1− µ
∗)(1− π∗S + 1− µ
∗π∗S) + µ
∗(1− µ∗π∗S)
=
∑
ω∈S
π∗ωǫ
2
ω + 1− π
∗
S + 1− µ
∗ = D.
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